An Ambivalent Commander in Chief Worsens a Bad Situation in Afghanistan

© 2010 Peter Free

 

24 September 2010

 

In war, if you can’t choose and commit, you lose

 

I have been critical of President Obama’s sense of the nation’s geopolitical interests and his apparently vacuous strategies in pursuit of them.  Though I attribute responsibility for much of the mess to the military-industrial complex and Congress, the Commander in Chief is the leader who has the power to change the nation’s course.

 

As the price in lives, inter-cultural hatreds, monetary costs, and flummoxed policies in Afghanistan and Pakistan escalates, I see no reason to change my negative assessment of our direction.

 

Today, pre-release copies of Bob Woodward’s Obama’s Wars fueled commentary about the Administration’s infighting in regard to conduct of the war in Afghanistan.  Washington Post columnist Michael Gerson’s evaluation is this:

 

The process was not only chaotic but highly politicized, with national security adviser James Jones criticizing the role of the "campaign set," which he also dubbed the "Politburo" and the "mafia." Obama himself tied the outcome of the policy review to political considerations.

 

A temporary increase of 30,000 troops coupled with a withdrawal deadline, it now seems, was an arbitrary compromise, not a fully developed military strategy. The armed forces were told to salute and make do. . . .

 

Cynics may regard this as typical. Actually, it is remarkable. It is the most basic duty of a commander in chief to pursue the national interest above any other interest. The introduction of partisan considerations into strategic decisions merits a special contempt.

 

© 2010 Michael Gerson, The reluctant commander in chief, Washington Post A19 (24 September 2010) (italics added)

 

Political considerations do not necessitate strategic waffling at an increased cost in other people’s lives

 

The President gets no argument from me that war is political.  And in the President’s defense, holding onto domestic support for war is critical to its successful pursuit.

 

But politics is not the issue.  Strategic goals in effectuating the national interest are.

 

The issue with the President’s ambivalent leadership is that a bad domestic political situation does not excuse poor geopolitical and war-making policies.  His desire to stay in office does not excuse waffling on revising formerly bad strategies into realistically more effective ones.

 

In truth, President Obama has yet to identify a sound geopolitical strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Iraq.

 

Conclusion the Commander in Chief is not properly commander-ing

 

In difficult times, real leadership shines.  The President is not shining.

 

People are dying.

 

Many of those who are not dying are losing priceless pieces of themselves in honorably carrying out a policy that lacks intelligent aim.