Pew Research Center’s Distorted Overview — of a Recent “Russia versus US” Global Reputation Opinion Poll — Represents a Heads Up for “Wannabe” Strategists

25 August 2015

Introduction

This essay goes after one of my peeves, the perennially slanted or completely uninsightful news interpretations that American media and think tanks put out.

This time it is (surprisingly) the Pew Research Center.

Citation — to the opinion poll that I will discuss

Bruce Stokes, Russia, Putin Held in Low Regard around the World: Russia’s Image Trails U.S. across All Regions, Pew Research Center (05 August 2015)

My three themes today

(1) As a geopolitical strategist, it is important to sift data totals oneself — otherwise someone else’s summary of them can mislead on a potentially grandiose scale.

(2) Be suspicious of opinion polls that ignore critically important populations.

(3) Beware artificially imposed data cut-off points.

The text with which I am going to quarrel

I noticed an unfortunate slant in Bruce Stokes’ summary of a Pew Research Center poll about national reputations across the planet.

The overview made our American reputation seem unassailable and Russia’s poor. When, in fact, our position looks (to me) to be on the cusp of weak — in exactly those geographic areas where we need it to be strong.

After I sifted the Pew data for myself, I wondered how Pew Research came up with the strategic point-missing summary that it did. Then, I saw that their team had (at least arguably) made the mistakes of:

(a) basing its conclusions on a visibly unrepresentative polling sample

and

(b) setting an artificially chosen 50 percent (majority) cut off point along an otherwise continuous spectrum — which, if more capably analyzed, would have led a more nuanced and accurate conclusion.

First — the questionable polling results summary

According to Pew Research Center:

Outside its own borders, neither Russia nor its president, Vladimir Putin, receives much respect or support, according to a new Pew Research Center survey.

A median of only 30% see Russia favorably in the nations outside of Russia. Its image trails that of the United States in nearly every region of the world.

At the same time, a median of only 24% in the countries surveyed have confidence in Putin to do the right thing in world affairs, and there is far less faith in the Russian leader than there is in U.S. President Barack Obama.

[With regard to the Russian Federation:]

Russia’s greatest support is in Vietnam (75%). But in only two other nations do about half or more of the public have a positive view of Russia: Ghana (56%) and China (51%).

Favorable opinion of Russia trails that of the U.S. by a significant margin in most regions of the world. The image gap is 43 points in Europe (U.S. 69%, Russia 26%); it is 42 points in Africa (U.S. 79%, Russia 37%). Only in the Middle East are opinions of Russia and the U.S. comparable, both notably poor: just 29% favorable for the U.S. and 25% favorable for Russia.

[And of Putin himself:]

In only two nations – Vietnam (70%) and China (54%) – do more than half the public have confidence in Russian President Vladimir Putin to do the right thing in world affairs. Among the 39 nations surveyed outside of Russia, a median of just 24% see him in a positive light. Nevertheless, Putin remains popular at home, with an 88% positive rating.

A median of 58% around the world hold a negative opinion about Putin. His strongest critics are in Spain (92% no confidence), Poland (87%), France (85%) and Ukraine (84%). Three-quarters or more in Western Europe and North America are also critical of Putin, as are majorities in the Middle East.

Three-quarters of Europeans have confidence in Obama to do the right thing in world affairs. Only 15% have such faith in Putin. By more than two-to-one, publics in Africa, Asia and Latin America trust Obama more than Putin. Only in the Middle East is confidence in Putin even close to confidence in Obama. And that is not because support for Putin is very high (25%), but rather because support for Obama is also quite low (36%).

© 2015 Bruce Stokes, Russia, Putin Held in Low Regard around the World: Russia’s Image Trails U.S. across All Regions, Pew Research Center (05 August 2015) (extracts, my inserted headings in bracketed italics)

Theme One — as a geopolitical strategist, it is important to sift data totals oneself

Subscribing to someone else’s arguably incompetent analysis is obviously going to lead to mistaken policies. My objection to Pew Research’s (arguably biased) slant will become clear, as I discuss Themes Two and Three below.

Theme Two — be suspicious of opinion polls that ignore critically important populations

I have no idea what Pew Research was thinking, other than to keep its folks out of hazardous areas, but the above cited “world” opinion poll included only a few countries from the Middle East.

Not surprisingly, these were Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories. Of those, four are active American allies.

Missing are the Middle East’s other powerhouses — Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia — as well as tumultuous Iraq and Syria.

Given that the United States is hanging on a “sad” strategic hook in the Middle East — one might wonder what useful strategic meaning a poll that leaves out the most pertinently important nations there has to offer.

Similarly missing from the Pew Research results are Afghanistan and most of Central Asia.

I do not think such a sample-biased poll has easily accessible meaning. Pew Research’s incorporated slant puts a greater burden on whoever is interpreting its results.

Let’s see what went wrong with the Pew poll summary.

The first question is — would Pew's conclusions matter, even if they were true insofar as they go?

Probably not. Geopolitically, some nations count more than others.

Running a planet-wide popularity contest between the United States and Russia tells us nothing of strategic importance.

What geopolitical analysts should instead be interested in is existing opinion in:

(a) those geographic locations that actually matter to American (or Russian) strategic positions at the moment and relatedly conceivable future

and

(b) how either nation can favorably and helpfully improve what people there think of them.

Strategically speaking, then — was Pew Research's written summary usefully accurate?

No.

In reading the graph immediately to the right of his overview, we see that Pew's analyst(s) inadvertently overlooked some of the most critically important information on that chart.

Whatever the team was doing, they were not thinking like geopolitical strategists would. The mistake irreparably and misleadingly twists their summarized polling data.

The real picture is this one

Take a look at the Pew article and its graphs here.

Scroll down the “Opinion of Russia” graph, looking for countries that the US has strategic interests in. Look also for our potential adversaries.

Leaving aside Vietnam — which Mr. Stokes helpfully included in his summary — notice how much strategic significance he and Pew seem to have missed.

The first number (below) is the Russia unfavorable impression and the second the Russia favorable:

China — 37 unfavorable to 51 favorable — in a population of 1.4 billion people

India — 17 to 43 — among its 1.3 billion people

South Korea — 43 to 46 — our usually reliable ally

Philippines — 44 to 44 — a former US territory

(Vietnam — 10 to 75 — brutalized during the Vietnam War)

Ghana — 27 to 56

Nigeria — 38 to 39 — the most populous country in Africa

Tanzania 24 to 38

Ethiopia 10 to 37

Uganda 34 to 37

Burkina Faso 28 to 34

Peru — 33 to 33 — in our own geographic hemisphere

These are substantial portions of each population.

Those that work against “us” are strategically significant. We should have learned by now that even quantitatively small minorities in any nation can create insoluble problems with regard to the execution of proposed American strategy.

Overlooking these pluralities just because they do not exceed the 50 percent mark — as much of the Pew analysis seems to do — is a mistake.

In other words — the two most populated nations on the planet see Russia more favorably than not

Large swaths of Africa agree with them.

And even our trusted ally, South Korea, is disposed the same way.

Therefore . . .

Breaking it down this way:

(a) With the second most powerful nation on the planet (China) more favorable toward Russia than not —

in company with

(b) the second most populous nation — India, itself a budding economic giant — similarly divided —

the following Pew Research statement is unimportant and arguably irrelevant to any substantive point:

A median of only 30% see Russia favorably in the nations outside of Russia. Its image trails that of the United States in nearly every region of the world.

How did Pew Research come up with such a strategically misleading summary of its results?

The same errancy is true of Pew’s statement regarding President Putin’s unpopularity

Regions important to us see President Putin less negatively than Pew Research’s summary would have us intuit.

That poll assessed “no confidence” versus “confidence” in the Russian president:

China — 29 no confidence to 54 confident

India — 15 to 36

Philippines — 32 to 46

(Vietnam — 11 to 70)

Ghana — 27 to 56

Nigeria — 30 to 44

Tanzania — 26 to 38

Ethiopia — 16 to 32

President Putin generally does not do as well as his Federation does globally, but still his numbers are not too shabby among some of the world’s most notably important nations.

Instead of overtly recognizing this to be true, Pew Research headlined that:

Putin’s Image Even Worse than That of Russia

Which is true, but again markedly irrelevant from the strategic perspective. Putin does well enough among those nations most likely to have the power to give the United States a major future pain in its (power declining) behind.

Why analytical errors like the above described ones matter

With regard to historical actuality, Russia has been only a minor trouble maker on the global scene. Especially so, when compared to the United States’ draconian introduction of bloody chaos into the Middle East by removing Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi (and others).

Indeed, one can make an evidence-supported argument that aggressive NATO and American actions prompted the Russian president to counter react aggressively in Crimea and Ukraine.

Skillfully applied American hypocrisy — saying one thing and invisibly doing another — boxed Russia into a corner from which its sphere of influence-preserving actions were negatively perceived by much of the world.

This is Machiavellian subtlety at its, perhaps ethically unattractive best. Kudos, I guess, to President Obama for pulling it off.

Notice, however, that even Pew Research’s slanted Middle East opinion survey sees the United States less favorably

Evidently many among those who have had to put up with our continual stream of militaristically inclined interventions are not very happy about them:

Only in the Middle East is confidence in Putin even close to confidence in Obama. And that is not because support for Putin is very high (25%), but rather because support for Obama is also quite low (36%).

Thus, the following inferred takeaway points

(1) It is possible to paint an adversary as evil in a way that much of the rest of the world will accept.

(2) But eventually — under the pressure of bullet-bomb-and-missile strikes — people begin to see through the “feel good” — imperialistically oriented — camouflage that American administrations out-puff.

(Yes, my smoking dope allusion is intentional.)

Vietnam’s numbers alone make this point clear.

And one can only guess what Pew Research’s unsurveyed Middle East and Central Asian populations might have had to say about the U.S. versus Russia question. My guess is that they are more evenly split on the US-Russia question than their fear-inspiring proximity to Russia might have us think.

A premise — Machiavellian subtlety has to be competently maintained over the long-term to be strategically effective

In this conflict between American and Russian soft power, we have yet to see who is going to come out on top. Or indeed, whether soft power in a conflict of the American-Russian kind matters at all.

My historical perspective indicates that Russians (and the Soviets before them) do not care much about soft power. It is their position on the ground that matters to them.

In this aspect of geopolitical chess, President Putin may be partially outplaying the United States — whether the globe’s opinion-sampled population approves or not.

Notice that Putin has leveraged pro-Russian opinion in the places he wants to “absorb” in ways that make the subsequent conquest easier. In contrast, the United States seems to be rather adept at “pissing off” large portions of the population in the places it occupies or “assists”.

It is (in my assessment) possible to get too deviously cute for one’s own good

Opinion changes in a metaphorical instant. Position of the ground generally does not.

Who then, really, is the dummy here?

Were I an influential American strategist

I would be cautious about giving the Russian Federation more excuses to push back against NATO at the expense of Russia’s border states.

And I would be equally cautious about further harming our American image — meaning U.S. soft power — by indulging in exceedingly stupid moves in the Middle East or anywhere else.

As a reminder in this last regard:

But in only two other nations do about half or more of the public have a positive view of Russia: Ghana (56%) and China (51%).

Economic giant China, with 1.4 billion people (inferentially) does not care for us. And India, also apparently, is not far behind.

Throw in troubling opinion numbers in Africa, as well those we can infer from the unsampled Middle East and Central Asia — and we have, I think, a looming strategic problem that Pew Research’s “world opinion” synopsis does not convey.

Where Pew Research would have us infer that Russia is weak and America strong in planet-wide estimation, my interpretation of their own polling data — applied with regard to the currently most strategically troublesome regions of the planet — is almost the reverse.

The moral? — Never take someone else’s data interpretation at face strategic value

Much of the time, as we have seen above, supposedly expert — but obviously biased — analysts grievously miss the critical import of the data that they have collected.

The problem is one of unexamined assumptions. I suspect that Pew and Bruce Stokes assumed that:

(a) total world opinion matters in some strategic sense

and

(b) a noticeably slanted and incomplete sampling of the world’s population would be good enough to reliably reveal whatever that opinion turned out to be.

Both these assumptions are (frankly) strategically foolish. Especially so, the second one — which cavalierly ignores the very peoples, who recently have the most reason to be upset with American leadership and policy.

Notice in my preceding paragraph that I assumed that strategic import matters. That assumption is an examined one:

Since world affairs and war are not beauty pageant matters, global opinion polls — like Pew’s "Russia versus U.S." one — are most significantly relevant to strategy-creation and implementation.

Interpreted any other way — at least, in the “us versus them” context Pew that implicitly placed this one — we miss the most critical point(s).

PeteFree.com

Pew Research Center’s Distorted Overview — of a Recent “Russia versus US” Global Reputation Opinion Poll — Represents a Heads Up for “Wannabe” Strategists